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Abstract
Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over one’s own actions. The strength of this
sense varies inter-individually. This means that people differ in their perception concerning
the intensity of their intentions and actions. The current study aims to determine the factors
influencing this sense of agency on a personality level. Furthermore, it gives insight into the
correlative relation between the strength of the sense of agency and substance use. The
study involved 210 participants who were tested for the experiment (intentional binding par-
adigm for sense of agency, hand paradigm for intentionality bias, questionnaires FAD-Plus,
NI-20, substance use). Significant determinants in personality were narcissism (vulnerable
subtype) and substance use (consumption in general beyond cannabis, and particularly for
the substances cannabis, ecstasy, and cocaine). Both personality types were associated
with a weaker sense of agency compared to controls. For both results, alterations in the
dopaminergic system need to be discussed. The present results confirm prior hypotheses
that dopamine seems to play a crucial role in perception of agency. Possibly a higher acces-
sibility of dopamine increases sense of agency (hyper-binding), whereas a lower accessibil-
ity of dopamine decreases sense of agency (hypo-binding). A second aim of the study was
to see whether there is a connection between sense of agency and intentionality bias. The
perception of intention in others differs widely; some people tend to see arbitrary or acciden-
tal actions as unintentional, and others quickly label actions as ‘intentional’ although the
information is not distinct for a categorization. This cognitive error is called intentionality
bias. Results could not confirm a relationship between the two constructs—one’s own inten-
tion and judging intention in others. This may be due to a lack of connection between the two
constructs or to methodological aspects. Further directions and limitations are discussed.
Introduction
Sense of agency, examined in this study, is defined by naming the cause of action [1]. It can be
considered as a precondition for free will. People feel that they can create actions and are able
to influence their surroundings. To measure the degree of consciousness of actions, an implicit
paradigm called ‘intentional binding’ can be used to measure sense of agency. Intentional
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binding defines a time shift in perception between an intentional executed action and a follow-
ing sensory event. If an action is intentional and feels controlled by the actor, a binding effect
can be observed: the time between action and event is perceived as shorter than in reality; in
other words there is a subjective compression of time [2]. The knowledge to be the cause of
one’s own action is an elementary and constant root for the interaction with the world [3]. A
possible explanation for alterations in sense of agency can be seen [4] in the ‘Comparator
Model’ [5]. It postulates that the sensory consequences of actions can be predicted based on
internal action-related information such as the efferent copy of a central motor command. In
accordance with this model, sense of agency is defined as a retrospective inference relating to
the causal structure of action and effect [6].
To identify determinants of sense of agency, we chose to examine the relation to certain
personality factors and particularly substance use.
Determinants of sense of agency: Current state of research
Sense of agency and personality. As to the relation of personality and sense of agency,
the concepts of free will and narcissism have been investigated in previous studies. Free will
and sense of agency both deliver information for the perception of action and events. They are
similar constructs from different perspectives: free will as an explicit measure—the judgement
of agency—and sense of agency as an implicit measure—the feeling of agency [7]. Narcissism
was chosen because narcissists perceive themselves and their actions as particularly important
and unique [8], a trait that has proved to influence sense of agency [9].
One study revealed that free-will beliefs are associated with conscious and unconscious pro-
cessing of information involved in purposive behaviour and agency [10]. People with stronger
beliefs in free will seem to concentrate on processing predictive signals of effects, thereby
showing greater intentional binding than shown by individuals with weak beliefs in free will.
This can be seen as a hint for a correspondence of stronger beliefs in free will and a stronger
focus on the outcomes of actions. However, the number of studies rejecting a correlation
between the implicit measure sense of agency and the explicit measures outweigh the ones
finding a convergence [11–14].
Regarding narcissism, a first study examining differences in personality and intentional
binding was published in 2015 [9]. People with medium and high scores of narcissism have a
stronger sense of agency than do people with low narcissism scores. It is possible that narcis-
sists experience themselves as highly effective agents and are more motivated and act more
dominant than people with lower narcissism scores. However, it needs to be considered that
none of the participants in that study reached a maximum score of narcissism, reducing the
explanatory power of the results. Personality traits that correlate with low narcissism, such as
low self-esteem, anxiety, and depression, have already been linked to a weaker sense of agency
or weaker sense of control in previous studies [15,16]. Nonetheless, the study gives exploratory
hints for personality being related to sense of agency [9]. It has been proposed to examine the
differences in sense of agency for the two subtypes of narcissism—the vulnerable type and the
grandiose type [17]—expecting a weaker sense of agency for the vulnerable type and a stronger
sense of agency for the grandiose type [18].
Sense of agency and dopamine. The manner of relationship between the dopaminergic
system and intentional control has not yet been understood. Dopamine is involved in
responses to attention-inducing stimuli and reward-related stimuli [19]. It is part of the moti-
vational reward system [20,21], but it is also involved in memory formation and motoric func-
tions [22]. Additionally, dopamine regulates the prediction of errors in action results [19,19]
and executive control [23]. The difference between the occurrence and the prediction of
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reward determines the reward response. This means that a temporal delay induces depression,
and an unpredicted time of reward (perceived earlier than predicted) leads to activation [19].
Information linked to reward not only supports control of intentional acts [24,23] but also
facilitates sense of agency. The activity of dopamine could increase the temporal binding of
action and event (affecting the sense of agency: higher coherence and self-generation). Conse-
quently, individuals with a low dopamine level will not profit from reward signals in their
sense of agency [24].
Several studies have found hints for an involvement of the dopaminergic system in sense of
agency. For example, one study used ketamine as a model for psychosis [25]. The aim of the
experiment was to see whether ketamine creates the effect observed in schizophrenia in previ-
ous studies [26–30]. The participants were given low doses (100ng/mL plasma) of ketamine
before performing the intentional binding task (measure for sense of agency). Ketamine
increased intentional binding significantly compared to the placebo group. Moreover, keta-
mine significantly augmented the predictive influence on action binding. This effect is similar
to the performance of patients with prodromal symptoms of schizophrenia [4].
Furthermore, psychosis-like experiences were seen to be correlated with an increased inten-
tional binding; age was negatively related to intentional binding. Both results can be caused by
alterations in the dopaminergic system [31]. There are findings for higher releases of dopa-
mine, higher synaptic dopamine concentrations, and higher dopamine receptor occupation in
people with experiences resembling psychosis [32–34], and dopamine levels in the brain
decrease with age [35,36].
Another relevant study in view of the dopaminergic system includes Parkinsonism and
sense of agency [37]. Dopaminergic medication is usually prescribed because Parkinson’s dis-
ease is accompanied by a loss of dopamine in the nigrostriatal pathway (38). While the motoric
effects of dopaminergic drugs are relatively shaped, cognitive effects are less understood. The
overdose theory claims that early stages of Parkinson’s disease lead to dopamine depletion in
the dorsal striatum [38]. Consequently, dopaminergic medication has a positive effect on cog-
nitive functions. At the same time, there is little dopamine depletion in the ventral striatum, so
that dopaminergic drugs interfere in this region through a dopaminergic overdose. In a review
[39] this was illustrated as an inverted U-shaped relationship between dopamine levels and
performance. The patient’s individual genotype has a major influence defining the relative
baseline position on the curve and the interaction with the dopaminergic medication and
thereby explains (different) interpersonal reactions and performances. The individual geno-
type (for genetic polymorphisms) determines the dopaminergic metabolism and availability of
dopamine. This study [37] first tested patients with Parkinson’s off medication, then on medi-
cation (L-Dopa, short-acting dopamine agonist) and compared these results with a healthy
control group. It seems that higher accessibility of dopamine increases the intentional binding
effect (sense of agency). The highest binding effect was found in patients on medication,
whereas patients off medication and the control group did not differ in their sense of agency.
Corresponding to this, Parkinson’s alone is not associated with alterations in sense of agency.
Dopaminergic medication boosts the action-binding effect. The significant effect lies in the
linkage of action and effect binding and not action binding or effect binding individually. This
means that the linkage might be experienced differently, but not the tone or action itself.
The studies on L-Dopa medication in Parkinson’s and on ketamine indicate the relevance
of the dopaminergic system to sense of agency. Dopamine increases the spectrum for the bind-
ing strength of two events. It is possible that the probability to include external stimuli is
increased by a high dopamine concentration and decreased by low dopamine activity [31].
This raises the question of whether and how a usage of other substances influences sense of
agency, particularly with respect to long-term changes, not only in acute intoxication. For
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clarification, further investigation of substance use and possible links to changes in sense of
agency is needed. Less dopamine accessibility seems to be linked to a weaker sense of agency.
It has to be investigated whether having an affinity to use drugs that change receptor mecha-
nisms in the dopaminergic system is related to a weaker sense of agency in the long run.
Sense of agency and substances. Already 20 years ago researchers suspected that chronic
use of drugs could induce changes in the neurotransmitter systems, particularly the dopamine
system [40]. Hence, it is important to investigate whether alterations in the dopaminergic sys-
tem, caused by drug use, lead to differences in sense of agency.
The substances in focus are cannabis, MDMA (e.g. ecstasy), cocaine, amphetamine (e.g.
speed), and psychedelics (ketamine, LSD, and mushrooms). Therefore, we concentrate rather
on long-term effects of substance use because none of the subjects will be tested for acute
intoxication of drugs.
Use of cannabis, contrary to use of other substances, is not associated with striatal dopa-
mine alterations. However, observable alterations (lower dopamine release in the associative
striatum) have been found in users who started early or reported a long duration of usage.
Consequently, it is difficult to distinguish the effects of chronicity versus onset [41]. Ecstasy
(MDMA, MDEA, MDA), an activating and hallucinogenic substance, directly affects the neu-
rotransmitter metabolism. In animal trials, an increase of serotonin level in the synaptic cleft
could be observed, which probably causes changes in the dopamine systems. Release of seroto-
nin could also be responsible for a higher dopamine release [42]. In apes, high doses change
the serotonin system irreversibly, mostly affecting parts of the brain responsible for memory
processes and development of anxiety [43]. Several other studies have confirmed that the level
of dopamine D2 receptor availability is lower than normal in drug-addicted subjects (alcohol-
ics, cocaine abusers, crystal abusers, heroin abusers) [44]. Cocaine use results in long-term
reduction in the hypothalamic and frontal cortex dopamine metabolism [45]. Even a single
cocaine exposure in mice leads to alterations in the dopamine metabolism; 10 days after
administration, receptors of dopamine cells are blocked [46]. Studies in rats suggest that
amphetamines produce a long-term striatal dopamine depletion by destroying striatal dopa-
mine nerve fibres [47], and even a single exposure to amphetamine seems to be sufficient to
induce long-term behavioural, neurochemical, and neuroendocrine sensitization [48]. In
regard to psychedelics, ketamine is a NMDA receptor antagonist that influences the dopami-
nergic and glutamatergic functions. Prediction error is understood to be a mismatch between
the agent’s expectation (from his or her environment) and real events, regulated by dopami-
nergic and glutamatergic mechanisms [49]. In animal studies, chronic dopamine depletion,
induced by chronic ketamine use, produces selective up-regulation of D1 receptor availability
(in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) [50]. The increased availability can be due to augmented
receptor density or affinity. The D1 receptor up-regulation might be caused by a drug-induced
deficit in prefrontal dopamine function. This up-regulation of D1 receptors could be an
attempt to compensate for the deficit. Repeated use of ketamine produces an alteration of the
prefrontal dopaminergic transmission. Parallels to the effects of chronic ketamine use can be
seen in schizophrenic patients [50]. Chronic ketamine use produces a deficit of prefrontal
dopamine function. Although a receptor up-regulation seems to compensate, still less dopa-
mine might be available. LSD is known to take effect in two phases, with the later temporal
phase mediated by D2 dopamine receptor stimulation. [51]. Even a single dose of LSD
increases the expression of a small set of genes in the mammalian brain that are involved in a
wide array of cellular functions, which reflects the beginnings of long-term neuro-adaptive
processes [52].
It is likely that people consuming drugs have developed different mechanisms in the dopa-
minergic system, resulting in a weaker sense of agency (if less dopamine is available, in
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abstinence) or a stronger sense of agency (if more dopamine is available, in acute consumption
of drugs).
Sense of agency and intentionality bias
In addition to the determinants of sense of agency in personality and substance use, we aim to
investigate how the sense of agency relates to perception of intention in others. Until now, no
research has combined perception of one’s own intention and evaluating the intention of oth-
ers. Do we expect others to have the same level of control as we feel to have ourselves? Alterna-
tively, do we measure their actions and intentions with different standards from our own
actions?
Concerning accidental or arbitrary actions of others, some people show a bias towards
interpreting actions as intentional. If an action was performed unintentionally, but the infor-
mation about the intention of action is missing, we still tend to label it as intentional. This con-
struct is called intentionality bias [53].
Rosset and Rottmann [54] developed a model with two routes of explaining the processing
for deductive reasoning in consideration of the intention of others. The first rapid and auto-
matic response to behaviour activates the intentionality bias. At first, all actions are categorised
as intentional. In a second process, a deliberate, more accurate analysis can overwrite this bias
in case of evidence for unintentional behaviour. According to this theory, classifying behaviour
is determined not only by the skill to recognize hints for intention but mainly through the skill
to identify errors of interpretation and the ability to overwrite these errors [54].
Until now, nothing has been known about the relationship of the two constructs. Is there a
connection between the degree of feeling in control of one’s own actions (sense of agency) and
the interpretation of intention (attribution of control) in other people’s actions (intentionality
bias)? And if so, do people with a higher sense of agency (higher feeling of control for their
actions) suspect more actions as intentional by others as well?
Goals and hypotheses
The first goal of this study is to find determinants for sense of agency in personality and sub-
stance use.
1. In terms of personality factors, evidence exists for a stronger sense of agency in narcissists
[9]. We extend the current state of research by differentiating between the vulnerable and
grandiose type of narcissism [17], expecting higher sense of agency in people with grandi-
ose narcissism and lower sense of agency in people with vulnerable narcissism [18].
Methodically, implicit (intentional binding) and explicit (FAD-Plus) measurements of
sense of agency do not correlate with each other [13,12,11].
2. Recent experiences have manifested that dopaminergic drugs boost sense of agency under
intoxication [37,25]. Substance use might influence the sensitivity of receptors and/or trans-
porters of the dopaminergic system, affecting sense of agency. A drug-induced deficit in the
dopaminergic function [50] could cause alterations in sense of agency. Lower availability of
dopamine is associated with a weaker sense of agency [24,31]. We hypothesize a negative
link between sense of agency and consuming the substances under investigation. Using
drugs might (in the long term) go along with alteration in the dopaminergic system (lower
dopamine levels), attributing for a weaker sense of agency.
The second goal of the current study is to determine whether the perception of intention of
one’s own action (sense of agency) and the evaluation of intention in the actions of others
(intentionality bias) are connected. Consequently, the third (non-directional) research
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question is whether sense of agency and intentionality bias correlate with each other. If the two
constructs are linked, it would be interesting to learn the following: Is the connection positive,
meaning that the more we perceive our own action as voluntary, the more we presume inten-
tion in others? Or is the link negative, meaning that the more we act voluntarily, the less we
expect others to act voluntarily?
Materials and methods
Power analysis
To estimate the sample size necessary to find effects, power analyses were run. Previous
research in narcissism has found overall binding values for high narcissism scores M = -157.40
(SD = 51.08) and low narcissism scores M = -100.20 (SD = 45.94) [9]. Power analysis, one
tailed for independent t-tests with α = .05, β = .95, and Cohen’s d = 1.177 calculated a necessary
sample size of N = 34.
An experiment using ketamine as a model for psychosis reported overall binding values of
placebo M = 45 (SD = 69), ketamine administration M = 72 (SD = 70) [25]. Power analysis,
one tailed for independent t-tests with α = .05, β = .95, and Cohen’s d = .388 calculated a neces-
sary sample size of N = 145. Although the power analysis for narcissism calculated that only a
small sample size is required, more participants were recruited with regard to effects for the
different substances.
Sample
We tested 210 participants for the experiment. Participants were informed about the purpose
of the study and gave their written consent prior to participation. The experiment was con-
ducted according to the ethical guidelines of the Helsinki Declaration. Data were analysed
anonymously. Participants gave information about their age, ranging from 17 to 34 years,
M = 23.33, SD = 3.52, and sex; 84 (40.0%) participants were male, 126 (60.0%) female. IQ mea-
sured by the Trail Making Test was M = 118.35, SD = 15.97, ranging from 88 to 145, to ensure
that both groups (drug users and controls) were demographically similar. Ten participants
were not students; the other participants were students who studied psychology (30), sport sci-
ences (99), arts and humanities (36), criminology (4), law (5), natural science (8), and other
disciplines (18).
We did not seek approval from a research ethics board because it was not required for this
study in accordance with conditions outlined in guidelines from the German Research Society
(DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft): Research bearing no additional risk beyond daily
activities does not require such approval. We communicated all considerations necessary to
assess the ethical legitimacy of the study. We thus ensure that our research approach is in line
with national and international human research ethics policies.
Apparatus and stimuli
Intentional binding. To assess intentional binding (sense of agency), the method of Hag-
gard et al. [2] was applied as a guiding procedure. The experimental paradigm was generated
by the description of Aarts and van den Bos [10]. The experiment was programmed by modi-
fying code from new HTML5 Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that maximize
accuracy and timing precision. These include the following features: 1) CSS animations for
presenting visual stimuli, 2) web audio API for presenting auditory stimuli, and 3) DOM event
timestamps for logging user interaction [55]. The participants watched an analogue clock,
marked with numbers in intervals of 5 (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 55). The duration of one clock
Dopamine and sense of agency
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rotation was 2560ms. In each trial, the clock rotated two times; the event occurred in all trials
in the second lap. There were four different conditions: two baselines and two agency blocks.
The order of conditions was counterbalanced between subjects.
1. Baseline action: The participants watched the analogue clock and pressed the key (space)
whenever they wanted to in the second lap. Afterwards they reported the time of pressing
the key (on the analogue clock).
2. Baseline outcome: The participants watched the analogue clock and heard a tone at a ran-
dom time. Afterwards they reported the time of hearing the tone (on the analogue clock).
3. Agency action: The participants watched the analogue clock and pressed the key (space)
whenever they wanted to in the second lap. A tone followed with a delay of 250ms. After-
wards the participants reported the time of pressing the key (on the analogue clock).
4. Agency outcome: This condition was identical to agency action, but this time the partici-
pants reported the time of hearing the tone (on the analogue clock).
In the three conditions when the participants had to press a key (conditions 1, 3, and 4),
they were asked to let the clock rotate once before pressing the key and not to press the key at a
certain time (always at the same time or only at the interval marks of 5). In addition, the
instruction indicated that they should be as precise as possible (in intervals of 1). Each block
contained 18 trials, according to Moore et al. [37].
Intentionality bias. To guarantee that language (grammar, choice of words) did not influ-
ence the task, a non-verbal task, developed by Moore and Pope [56], was used in the experiment.
The participants watched videos in which a hand whose finger was linked to a keyboard could
be seen (see Fig 1). In the video, the finger was pulled down toward the keyboard. The partici-
pants were asked to decide whether the finger actively pressed the key (intentional) or was
pulled down by the keyboard (not intentional). In all videos, the finger was pulled down by the
keyboard, representing a non-intentional condition. The videos with four different onset times
until the finger was moved were presented 26 times. Two of them were exercise trials and not
included in the analysis. The 24 trials were taken together (0 = not intentional, 1 = intentional),
and this score in percent evaluated the strength of the intentionality bias for each person.
Trail Making Test. The Trail Making Test (ZVT; [57]) measures cognitive processing
speed. The test consists of four pages, where the numbers 1 to 90 are arranged in a scrambled
order in a matrix of 9 rows and 10 columns. The participants had to connect the numbers as
quickly and correctly as possible in ascending order, measuring the total time for each page.
The test duration was about 5 minutes. The evaluation revealed ZVT scores, which were trans-
ferred to corresponding IQ values. The correlation (e.g. Raven-SPM, CFT-30) ranged between
r = .60 to .80. The test–retest reliability as well as the internal consistency of the ZVT was
about .90 to .95 [58].
Questionnaires. Demographics. Participants reported sex, age, studies, and profession.
Narcissism Inventory. Narcissism is measured by the Short Version of the Narcissism
Inventory (NI-20) of Daig et al. [59]. The basic concept is the narcissism inventory (NI-90) of
Schoeneich et al. [60]. The short version is composed of four factors: 1) threatened self, with
eight subscales (helpless self, loss of control over affects and impulses, de-realization/deperson-
alization, basic potential of hope, worthless self, negative bodily self, social isolation, and with-
drawal into feelings of harmony); 2) classic narcissistic self, including four subscales (self-
grandiosity, longing for an idealized self-object, greed for praise and reassurance, and narcis-
sistic furore); 3) idealistic self, with four subscales (self-reliance ideal, object devaluation, ideal-
izing values, and symbiotic self-protection); and 4) hypochondriac self, with the subscales of
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hypochondriac expression of fear and narcissistic gain from illness. The Cronbach’s alpha was
above .7. The factor structure was confirmed by an exploratory and confirmatory factor analy-
sis. Moreover, it was normed and compared by samples, N = 2262 and N = 2265 [59]. Threat-
ened self represents the vulnerable type and classic narcissistic self the grandiose type; only
these two scales will be used for analysis.
FAD-Plus. The FAD-Plus covers four scales: free will, scientific determinism, fatalistic
determinism, and unpredictability, with 27 items in total. It was normed by N = 257, N = 177,
and N = 188 participants. Concerning quality criteria, the authors mention reliability (Cron-
bach’s alpha .69 to .82 for the subscales). The four factorial structure was conformed in a con-
firmatory analysis [61].
Substances. The items to gather information about the substance use of the participants
were self-generated from the AUDIT [62] questionnaire of the addiction research network
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg UKL Freiburg, classifying the use of alcohol. There were two categories:
ever consumption and prior-year average consumption of alcohol, nicotine, prescription phar-
maceuticals (painkiller, tranquilizer, medication for physiological diseases), and illegal drugs
(cannabis, amphetamine, ecstasy, LSD, mushrooms, ketamine, cocaine). In addition, the
amount, frequency, and years of use were registered for each substance.
Procedure and experimental design
The study took part at the University of Regensburg, and the duration was roughly 50 minutes.
Sessions started with the ZVT [57], followed by the computer experiment of intentionality bias
Fig 1. Intentionality bias paradigm. Screenshot of video by Moore and Pope [56] for the intentionality bias
paradigm.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214069.g001
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[56] and intentional binding [2,10]. The second part included the online questionnaires gener-
ated with Sosci-Survey. The ZVT and two computer-based experiments took about 30 min-
utes, and the questionnaires 20 minutes.
Statistical analysis
To calculate intentional binding in each trial, perceived time was subtracted from actual time
to determine the perception error. First, action binding and outcome binding were calculated
individually. Action binding is composed of baseline action minus agency action, and outcome
binding of baseline outcome minus agency outcome (to generate the difference from baseline
to the operant conditions). Outcome binding was then subtracted from action binding to cal-
culate overall binding [25,37]. Medians instead of means were used to eliminate outliers [63].
The Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated to examine relationships between the
two constructs (sense of agency and intentionality bias), the link between sense of agency and
personality factors, symptoms of disorder, and substance use. One-tailed t-tests were con-
ducted for the highest versus lowest percentiles in narcissism types and different groups of sub-
stance users versus the control group.
The alpha error accumulation for the three questionnaires was calculated by using the for-
mula 1 –(1–0.03)3. This means that the alpha error was 8.73% instead of 5%; therefore, the
level of significance needed to be adjusted. The significance level was corrected according to
Bonferroni, and the p-value was set to p = .017 to reach significance.
Results
Determinants of sense of agency
To understand the nomological network of the sense of agency and the examined variables,
Table 1 shows all correlation coefficients to sense of agency, and Table 2 focuses on frequency
of use of different substances. Only the correlation for ketamine reached significance.
Sense of agency and demographics. The mean intentional binding was M = 84.70
(SD = 136.41). Negative values signify that the event is perceived later than it really was, and
Table 1. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for determinants and sense of agency.
Variable r p
Age (one-tailed) -.103 .073
IQ (two-tailed) -.011 .878
Personality (one-tailed)
Threatened Self (vulnerable) -.146 .020
Hypochondriac Self -.007 .461
Classic Narcissistic Self (grandiose) -.076 .142
Idealistic Self .029 .342
Narcissism (overall) -.078 .135
Beliefs (two-tailed)
Free will -.093 .191
Scientific Determinism -.007 .918
Fatalistic Determinism .161 .022
Unpredictability .056 .432
Intentionality Bias (two-tailed) -.101 .154
Significance: p� .017
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214069.t001
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positive values indicate that the event is perceived earlier than it really occurred. The mean
shift in the baseline action was M = -50.79 (SD = 95.62), mean shift in the agency action condi-
tion was M = -90.91 (SD = 117.55), mean shift in the baseline outcome condition was M =
-59.40 (SD = 55.33), and mean shift in agency outcome was M = -14.18 (SD = 130.24). Action
binding (baseline action minus agency action) was M = 41.52 (SD 77.77), and outcome bind-
ing (baseline outcome minus agency outcome) was M = -45.17 (SD = 122.01). No difference
(in overall binding) could be observed for sex (male M = 81.67, SD = 142.50, female M = 86.73,
SD = 132.74, t(200) = -.258 p = 797), age (19–34, weaker sense of agency than in older people),
or IQ. Due to technical errors, data were missing from eight participants in intentional binding
(drug users = 3, controls = 5 missing).
Sense of agency and personality. Contrary to results previously reported in the literature,
no correlation to general narcissism (r = -.078 p = .269) was found. Splitting the sample into
the first and fourth percentiles of the subscales threatened self (vulnerable type) and classic
narcissistic self (grandiose type), the following results were produced. The vulnerable type had
a weaker shift in perception of the key press if the tone followed (agency action trials), and
consequently a weaker sense of agency (total binding), than people with low scores of vulnera-
bility (see Table 3). Independent t-tests showed differences (t(2470) = -7.529 p< .001) from
Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients (one-tailed) for frequency of use and sense of agency.
Frequency of Use r p
All participants
Alcohol -.095 .140
Smoking .108 .079
Cannabis -.056 .222
Drugs (users only)
Tranquilizers .143 .106
Psychotropics .029 .400
Cannabis .185 .062
Amphetamine .168 .071
Ecstasy .196 .043
LSD .220 .027
Mushrooms .230 .022
Ketamine .250 .014
Cocaine .136 .118
Significance: p� .017, Users only = consumption beyond cannabis N = 78
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214069.t002
Table 3. Sense of agency and threatened self.
Subscale Mhigh SD Mlow SD t-test p
Baseline action -47.00 91.50 -54.94 95.08 -.391 .349
Agency action -68.48 88.93 -127.77 132.12 -2.689 .004
Baseline outcome -53.85 53.58 -65.74 49.81 -1.186 .119
Agency outcome -26.29 110.11 -14.20 152.75 -.469 .320
Total binding 53.22 122.32 118.36 172.88 2.208 .015
One-tailed t-tests for intentional binding conditions, first (high, N = 50) versus fourth (low, N = 55) percentiles in the narcissism subscale threatened self. Significance p
� .017.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214069.t003
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the means of threatened self in this study (N = 209, M = 1.920, SD = .635) compared to the
means in the norms (N = 2262, M = 2.620, SD = 1.330), and threatened self was significantly
smaller in the current study in comparison to mean norms (patients from Charite´ Clinic,
Berlin).
The grandiose type discriminated neither in binding nor in the sub-conditions, as pre-
sented in Table 4. Means in this study and means from the norms did not differ from each
other (this study N = 209, M = 2.375, SD = .645, norms N = 2262, M = 2.520, SD = 1.190,
t(2470) = -1.737 p = .083).
All explicit measures of beliefs measured by the FAD-Plus, in particular the subscale free
will and sense of agency, as an implicit measure, were independent (r = .09 p = .21).
Sense of agency and substances. Demographics of Users and Controls. Comparing
both groups, drug users were on average three years older than controls (users’ age M = 25.01,
SD = 3.71, controls M = 22.27, SD = 2.94, t(208) = -5.931 p< .001), and IQ was lower in the
group of drug users (controls M = 120.72, SD = 15.61, users M = 114.51, SD = 15.87, t(197) =
2.712 p = .007). There were different gender ratios, the control group had more female mem-
bers (N = 129, 40 male, 89 female), the experimental group more male members (N = 81, 44
male, 37 female). The differences in demographics are not expected to explain alterations in
sense of agency (no differences for demographics for all participants in intentional binding,
see Sense of Agency and Demographics).
Table 5 lists how many participants consumed each substance (ever consumed).
In regard to substance use (ever), there were several differences in binding (see Table 6).
Independent t-tests showed significant differences in sense of agency for drug users who had
consumed cannabis, ecstasy, or cocaine and new variable computed by summarizing all users
who had consumed other drugs besides cannabis (at least one additional substance) compared
to the control group: Consumers had a significantly weaker sense of agency than did controls.
Fig 2 illustrates the alterations in perception. One can conclude that drug users have greater
intervals of binding between action (key press) and event (tone), due to later perception of the
time of tone.
Table 4. Sense of agency and classic narcissistic self.
Subscale Mhigh SD Mlow SD t-test p
Baseline action -59.35 102.20 -61.26 94.64 -.097 .462
Agency action -82.10 108.20 -102.44 119.57 -.883 .190
Baseline outcome -65.50 65.68 -60.20 58.04 .430 .334
Agency outcome -19.62 118.50 -4.00 142.45 .589 .279
Total binding 68.63 106.22 91.46 147.00 .867 .194
One-tailed t-tests for intentional binding conditions, first (high, N = 44) versus fourth (low, N = 56) percentiles in the narcissism subscale scores for classic narcissistic
self. Significance p� .017.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214069.t004
Table 5. Consumed substances (Ever).
Cannabis Ecstasy Amphetamine Mushrooms LSD Cocaine Ketamine > Cannabis
yes 131 63 57 44 43 49 34 81
No 78 146 152 165 166 160 175 129
Absolute number of users.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214069.t005
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Sense of agency and intentionality bias
The analysis rejects any association between sense of agency and intentionality bias. Appar-
ently there is no connection between how people perceive the control of their own actions and
how they regard the control and intention in the actions of others (r = -.101 p = .154).
Discussion
Determinants of sense of agency
The current study found significant determinants for sense of agency in personality, in the vul-
nerable subtype of narcissism, and for several substances in drug users (cannabis, ecstasy,
cocaine, substances beyond cannabis). Both groups showed a decrease in intentional binding;
they seemed to have a weaker link between action and consequence. A relation between the
explicit (FAD-Plus) and implicit measure (intentional binding) of free will could not be found,
nor was there a connection between intentionality bias and sense of agency (intentional
binding).
Table 6. Differences in sense of agency (overall binding) between drug users and controls.
Substance Musers SD Mcontrol SD t-test p
Cannabis 67.51 136.31 111.29 133.13 2.227 .014
Ecstasy 51.87 139.51 97.77 133.28 2.203 .015
Amphetamine 60.80 141.07 92.84 134.12 1.489 .069
Mushrooms 67.49 132.90 88.58 137.47 .898 .185
LSD 66.29 147.33 88.63 133.63 .935 .176
Cocaine 43.74 124.84 96.38 137.85 2.340 .010
Ketamine 76.42 138.23 85.63 136.45 .359 .360
> Cannabis 55.37 134.50 103.15 134.26 2.454 .008
One-tailed t-tests for sense of agency in users versus controls for each substance. Significance p� .017. Drug users = consumption beyond cannabis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214069.t006
Fig 2. Intentional binding of drug users versus controls. Illustrated are shifts in perception (difference = actual time
minus perceived time) for baseline action (1), baseline outcome (2), agency action (3), and agency outcome (4). Key
press = action, tone = event. Drug users = consumption beyond cannabis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214069.g002
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Sense of agency and personality. Previously, in narcissists, a stronger sense of agency
has been found [9]. In this study, we distinguished between different forms of narcissism,
because there has been evidence that narcissism occurs in two subtypes: the vulnerable and
the grandiose type [64]. Dimaggio and Lysaker [18] supposed that the two types of narcissists
also differ in their sense of agency. The vulnerable subtype could be more closely linked to
reduced agency (e.g. when being rejected in a romantic relationship, which impairs an
already unstable self-esteem [65]), while the grandiose type experiences hyper-agency. This
is a possible explanation for our results. It can be seen in the factor of the threatened self,
which contains—among others—the aspects of helpless self, worthless self, negative bodily
self, and social isolation. These facets embody the vulnerability–sensitivity type [59], the
covert form of narcissism. Our results confirm a lower sense of agency in the highest percen-
tile compared to the lowest percentile. Grandiosity–exhibitionism is represented by the clas-
sic narcissistic self [59]. The hypothesis for a stronger sense of agency in people scoring high
on this subscale cannot be confirmed. Results from previous studies have shown negative
correlations between social desirability and narcissism questionnaires, which may explain
the lack of results for grandiose narcissism (caused by covering narcissistic tendencies/per-
sonality traits [66]).
A recently published study differentiated also between the two subtypes of narcissism, gran-
diose type and vulnerable type. These subtypes are theoretically (biologically) based on the
behavioural approach (BAS, sensitivity to reward) and behavioural avoidance (BIS, sensitivity
to punishment) systems of personality (Gray) [67]. The study links the subtypes of narcissism
to possible alterations in the dopaminergic systems [68]. High BAS and low BIS predicted
grandiose narcissism; moderate BAS and high BIS predicted vulnerable narcissism. A strong
imbalance between the motivational systems BIS and BAS can be predicted by changes in the
dopaminergic system [69]. It is possible that the underlying motivational concepts explain the
differences found in the vulnerable narcissism subtype. This is a first hint for a mediating role
of dopamine in narcissism and sense of agency.
Sense of agency and substances. Being experienced with multiple drug use (consumption
besides cannabis) in general, and particularly with the consumption of cannabis, ecstasy, or
cocaine was significantly related to a weaker sense of agency in our experimental subjects. In
the baseline conditions, the values of perception were similar, negating a prolonged perception
in general for drug users. However, changes occur if actions and consequences are presented
in the same trial. Usually people tend to compress the time between action and event. In drug
users, in our study, the tone was perceived later, which extended the interval between action
and consequence.
The number of participants in this study limits the generalization of results to specific sub-
stances. In addition, the majority of the examined participants reported poly-drug use and
variations in amount, frequency, and years of use, which limited the examination for single
substances. At the same time, the study included participants who reported only a single drug
consumption. The sample was heterogeneous; therefore, use of drugs seemed to produce a
robust effect in the binding mechanism. Effects of single substances remain too difficult to
interpret. However, their connecting feature is the possible alteration of the dopaminergic
system.
Sense of agency and intentionality bias
In the current data, no correlation could be found between the constructs sense of agency and
intentionality bias. The experimental paradigm was conducted very simply to control potential
influencing factors. Engbert et al. [70] conducted three experiments, drawing the conclusion
Dopamine and sense of agency
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214069 March 19, 2019 13 / 19
that sense of agency is relational, generalizable, requires efferent motor commands, and is pri-
vate rather than socially shared. The last aspect includes the fact that people do not simulate
the agency of others. This could be one explanation for the independence of sense of agency
(in oneself) and intentionality bias (in others) in this study. Considering that this is the first
study, to our knowledge, to investigate the relationship between the two constructs, it is possi-
ble that this lack of connection is due to methodological issues and that a connection could be
found in a different operationalization of measurements.
“Too often, we judge other groups by their worst examples—while judging ourselves by our
best intentions” (Bush, 2016). We judge ourselves by our intentions; we judge others by their
actions. This citation emphasizes that judging our own intentions may differ widely, but sys-
tematically, from understanding intention and actions in others. In contrast to the highly con-
trolled laboratory experiment, in the outside world various potential aspects influence the
judgement, for example situational factors, personality and mood factors, or the relationship
of agents. Again, operationalization might be a highly contributing factor for the present
results.
Limitations and future research
In this study we investigated alterations in sense of agency in students, with an emphasis on
illegal drug users. A sample of patients suffering from addictions, in a quasi-experimental
design, could have delivered more distinct results. Alternatively, it would be interesting to
examine people who consumed only a single substance, although recruiting such a homoge-
nous sample might be an obstacle. Nevertheless, the results indicate an involvement of dopa-
mine for sense of agency, even on a level that does not rise to a clinical one. Possibly the
determination of the dopamine level could reveal whether higher accessibility of dopamine
leads to hyper-binding and lower accessibility to hypo-binding. However, dopamine levels
vary significantly, even intra-individually, so that many confounding factors would need to be
controlled. Another possibility could be to determine gene types and genetic polymorphism
involved in the dopaminergic metabolism (e.g. a transporter gene). For example, there are two
variants of the COMT enzyme (COMT-Met versus COMT-Val), that increase or decrease the
dopamine level [71]. It could be useful to determine the enzyme type of each person and con-
nect it to the strength of sense of agency.
In regard to narcissism, it would be interesting to take a closer look at the underlying moti-
vational systems BIS and BAS. A clinical sample could produce stronger effects. In this study,
the participants did not report high narcissistic traits. Subsequent studies could focus on a
comparison between healthy individuals and the two subtypes of narcissism. Additionally,
other mental diseases like attention deficit hyperactivity disorder [72] or eating disorders
(anorexia nervosa [73]), which are discussed as having alterations in the dopamine metabo-
lism, or emotional states releasing dopamine (e.g. arousal, see [74]), could be investigated as
well.
Self-report questionnaires bear the risk of misreport and social desirability, especially in
narcissism questionnaires. A second measure, more independent and objective than self-
reports, could offer more elucidation. Sense of agency was measured with a validated paradigm
[2]. Since then, the experiment has been adapted by several research teams to get more detailed
information about the subdivision of predictive and postdictive parts of sense of agency. How-
ever, in this study, the standard deviation was remarkably high, although the code written by
Pablo Garaizar [55] is very accurate. This could indicate that sense of agency differs widely
among the participants. It would be interesting to observe the stability of intentional binding
from a retest reliability perspective. Yet to our knowledge, no study has been conducted that
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has investigated intra-individual differences in intentional binding over a longer period, at dif-
ferent times a day, or under certain conditions, e.g. emotional states or stress.
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